Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint

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Abstract

This paper re-examines the question of whether federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under-provision of public goods by adding the assumption that the member states are free to leave the economic federation. We show that federal ex-post redistribution no longer necessarily means under-provision of local and federal public goods.

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1 Introduction

The question of how federal ex-post redistribution affects the incentives for public good provision at lower levels of government has been addressed in several previous studies. These studies focus on economic federations with decentralized leadership, where ex-post redistribution at the federal level means that the federal government redistributes across lower level jurisdictions after it observes the policies decided upon by the lower level governments. One important reason for analyzing the policy incentives implicit in such decision-structures is that the European Union (EU) plays an important fiscal role in Europe by redistribution between the member states and provision of certain public goods like services. Since the EU is still in its infancy as a fiscal union, and (at least some of) the member countries may already have pre-committed to their tax policies or expenditure programs, the EU most likely shares the characteristics of an economic federation with decentralized leadership discussed above. Earlier research shows that federal ex-post redistribution in terms of private consumption across citizens in different regions may under certain conditions lead to efficient provision of public goods (Caplan, Cornes and Silva, 2000; Caplan and Silva, 2011), whereas federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds typically leads to under-provision of public goods at the lower level of government as it undermines the local incentive to collect tax revenue (Köthenbürger, 2004, 2007).1

Yet, these previous studies assume that the number of member states/regions in the economic federation is fixed and does not depend on the redistribution policy chosen by the federal government. The present paper re-examines the effects of federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds under the assumption that membership is voluntary by adding a participation constraint to the decision-problem faced by the federal government. This change of assumption is clearly relevant from the perspective of the EU, where each member state is free to leave the union.2 It is also important from a theoretical point of view, i.e. for our understanding of policy incentives: we show that federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds no longer necessarily leads to under-provision of public goods at the lower level of government. Instead, if the participation constraint is binding for a certain group of member states, and if another group of member states is acting first mover vis-a-vis the federal level, the disincentive to collect tax revenue due to federal ex-post redistribution might be fully offset by an effect through the participation constraint. We also derive a similar result with respect to a federal public good: although federal ex-post redistribution would lead to under-provision in the absence of any participation constraint (i.e., in a framework such as that used in earlier comparable literature), a binding participation constraint may lead to efficient provision also of the federal public good. Section 2 presents the model, while the main results are discussed in Section 3.

1See also the related literature on environmental policy; e.g., Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan and Silva (1999) and Aronsson, Jonsson and Sjögren (2006).

2This is further emphasized by the recent financial crisis in the Euro-area, where the option of leaving the European Monetary Union (which is part of the EU) has been discussed in some of the member states.
2 The Model

To simplify the analysis as much as possible, we consider an economic federation comprising two groups of member states; denoted by 1 and 2, respectively, and referred to as "countries" in what follows. Since the number of countries in each such group is of no importance for the qualitative results derived below, it will be normalized to one. Also, each country is populated by identical residents, whose number is normalized to one. In country $i$ ($i = 1, 2$), a national government collects tax revenue to finance a national public good (the benefits of which are only enjoyed by the residents of country $i$), while the federal government redistributes between the countries in terms of public funds as well as provides a federal public good (whose benefits are enjoyed by all residents of the economic federation).

2.1 Consumers and Firms

The utility function faced by the residents in country $i$ is given by

$$U_i = U_i(c_i, g_i, G) = u_i(c_i) + \phi_i(g_i) + \Psi_i(G)$$

for $i = 1, 2$, where $c_i$ denotes private consumption, $g_i$ a national public good provided by the government in country $i$ and $G$ a federal public good provided by the federal government. Since none of the results to be derived below refer to work hours, we assume that each consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically. As such, the consumers are passive agents; they consume their income net of national income taxation, $c_i = y_i - t_i$, where $y_i$ denotes the before-tax income and $t_i$ the tax payment, while treating the two public goods, $g_i$ and $G$, as exogenous.

Output is produced by a linear technology such that the before-tax wage rate (which, in this case, coincides with the before-tax income due to that the labor supply is inelastic) is fixed.

2.2 National and Federal Objectives and Constraints

We assume that the objective function faced by each level of government is a social welfare function. Since the residents in each country are identical, the objective of the national government in country $i$ is given by $U_i$ in equation (1), while the objective of the federal government is a utilitarian utility sum, i.e. $U = \sum_i U_i$.\(^3\)

The budget constraints faced by the national government is country $i$ and the federal government can be written as

$$g_i = t_i - s_i,$$ 

$$G = \sum_i s_i,$$

respectively, where $s_i$ denotes a fee (positive or negative) paid by the national government in country $i$ to

\(^3\)None of the qualitative results derived below would change if we generalize the federal welfare function such that $U = \sum_i \alpha_i U_i$, where $\sum_i \alpha_i = 1$. We will, therefore, use the simpler utilitarian formulation in the text.
the federal government.

A novelty here is that we allow the member countries to leave the economic federation (or, equivalently, that a potential entrant may decide not to enter), which means that the federal redistribution and provision must be carried out subject to participation constraints. This participation constraint is assumed to be binding for one of the countries, while it is not necessarily binding for the other. Therefore, if we assume that the participation constraint is binding for country 2 (an arbitrary choice of no significance for the qualitative results), this constraint may be written as

$$U_2(c_2, g_2, G) = \hat{U}_2$$

where $\hat{U}_2$ denotes the reservation utility, which depends on the private consumption and consumption of the national public good if the country leaves the economic federation. The reservation utility is treated as exogenous by the federal government.

3 Redistirbution and Provision of Public Goods

The policy problem analyzed here is characterized by decentralized leadership. The order of decision-making is as follows: (i) either one or both countries move first by deciding upon their tax revenue while recognizing how this choice will affect the fee that both countries pay to the federal government; (ii) the remaining (non-leader) country decides upon its tax revenue, and the federal government decides upon its redistribution policy, while treating the policy instruments faced by all other policy-makers as exogenous. Following earlier comparable literature (see the introduction), we also assume that the national governments treat one another as Nash-competitors (irrespective of whether they are first movers vis-a-vis the federal level).

3.1 Federal Government

The federal government redistributes lump-sum in terms of public funds through the fees levied on the national governments and provides the federal public good, $G$, while treating the tax revenue collected by the national governments, $t_1$ and $t_2$, as exogenous. As such, the federal government chooses $s_1$, $s_2$ and $G$ to maximize $U = \sum_i U_i$ subject to the national and federal public budget constraints given in equations (2) and (3), respectively, and the participation constraint given in equation (4). By substituting equations (2) and (3) into the objective function to obtain a decision-problem only in $s_1$ and $s_2$, the additional first order conditions can be written as

$$s_1 : \quad -U_{1,g} + U_{1,G} + (1 + \lambda)U_{2,G} = 0 \quad (5a)$$

$$s_2 : \quad (U_{2,G} - U_{2,g})(1 + \lambda) + U_{1,G} = 0 \quad (5b)$$

where $\lambda$ denotes the Lagrange multiplier attached to the participation constraint, while $U_{1,g} = \partial U_i/\partial g_i$ and $U_{1,G} = \partial U_i/\partial G$ are the marginal utilities of national and federal public goods, respectively, in country $i$. 

4
By using equations (4), (5a) and (5b), we can solve for \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) and functions of \( t_1 \) and \( t_2 \) as follows (the dependence on constant terms has been suppressed):

\[
\begin{align*}
  s_1 &= s_1(t_1, t_2) \\
  s_2 &= s_2(t_1, t_2).
\end{align*}
\]

The sign above each argument indicates comparative statics. Notice in particular that an increase in \( t_1 \) leads to an increase in \( s_2 \); a consequence of the participation constraint. Without the participation constraint, we would have found that \( \partial s_2 / \partial t_1 < 0 \) (while the other qualitative comparative statics would remain as above).

The intuition is that an increase in \( t_1 \) leads to an increase in the federal public good, ceteris paribus; in turn, this means that the federal government can increase \( s_2 \) without violating the participation constraint. This mechanism is crucial for the results to be derived in the next section.

### 3.2 National Governments

Clearly, since national governments may differ with respect to commitment power vis-a-vis the federal level, we distinguish between a country whose government acts as Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the federal level, and a country whose government treats the federal government as a Nash-competitor (i.e. moves simultaneously with the federal government). If the national government in country \( i \) acts as a Nash-competitor towards the federal level, it chooses \( t^i \) and \( g^i \) to maximize its own welfare function, \( U_i \), subject to the national public budget constraint given in equation (2a), while treating \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) (and, therefore, \( G \)) as exogenous. On the other hand, if the national government in country \( i \) acts as first mover vis-a-vis the federal level, it will also recognize that \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) (and, therefore, \( G \)) are affected by its own policy choice through equations (6a) and (6b).

Let \( MRS_{s_i}^{g,c} = U_{i,g}/U_{i,c} \) denote the marginal rate of substitution between the national public good and private consumption faced by the resident in country \( i \), while \( MRS_{s_i}^{G,G} = U_{i,G}/U_{i,c} \) denotes the corresponding marginal rate of substitution between the federal public good and private consumption. By substituting equations (2) and (3) into the objective function, such that \( t_i \) becomes the effective decision-variable for the national government, the first order condition can be written as follows if the national government behaves as a Nash-competitor vis-a-vis the federal government:

\[
MRS_{s_i}^{g,c} = 1, \tag{7}
\]

which is the well-knowns Samuelson condition. Instead, if the national government behaves as Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the federal level, the corresponding first order condition becomes

\[
MRS_{s_i}^{g,c} = 1 + \left[ MRS_{s_i}^{g,c} - MRS_{s_i}^{G,G} \right] \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial t_i} - MRS_{s_j}^{G,G} \frac{\partial s_j}{\partial t_i}, \tag{8}
\]

for \( j \neq i \). Therefore, based on equation (8), efficient provision of the national public good requires that the second and third terms on the right hand side sum to zero.

We are now ready to derive the main result:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the participation constraint binds for country 2. (a) If the national government in country 1 acts as Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the federal level, while the national government in country 2 behaves as a Nash-competitor towards the federal level, a subgame perfect equilibrium satisfies

\[ MRS_i^{a,c} = 1 \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_i MRS_i^{G,c} = 1. \]

(b) If the national government in country 2 is Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the federal level, while the national government in country 1 behaves as a Nash-competitor towards the federal level, the subgame perfect equilibrium instead satisfies

\[ MRS_1^{a,c} = 1, \quad MRS_2^{a,c} > 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_i MRS_i^{G,c} > 1. \]

An obvious corollary to Proposition 1 is that if the national governments in both countries are first movers vis-a-vis the federal level, then the national public good of country 2 and the federal public good will be under-provided.

However, the most interesting aspect of the proposition is that the outcome in terms of efficiency depends on in which country (or country-group) the national government is first mover vis-a-vis the federal level. More specifically, if the government in the country for which the participation constraint does not bind is first mover, while the government in the country for which the participation constraint is binding engages in Nash-competition with the federal level, the outcome is efficient: \( g_1, g_2 \) and \( G \) are all provided in accordance with the Samuelson condition. This is clearly different from the outcome that would follow in the absence of the participation constraint, which always implies under-provision of the national public good by the strategic leader country and under-provision of the federal public good, respectively.

Proposition 1 follows from the comparative statics properties of equations (6a) and (6b). We start with part (a). Notice first that the policy rule for public provision in country 2 is given by equation (7), since the national government in country 2 treats \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \) as exogenous. For country 1, on the other hand (which is first mover vis-a-vis the federal level), the policy rule is given by equation (8): yet, due to the comparative statics properties of the federal redistribution problem, the second and third terms on the right hand side of equation (8) sum to zero in this case. To give some intuition, suppose that country 1 raises its tax revenue by one dollar. This raises the fee that the federal government in country 1 pays to the federal government and also the fee that country 2 pays. The increase in \( s_2 \) is due to that a higher \( s_1 \) relaxes the participation constraint through an increase in \( G \), ceteris paribus, which, in turn, gives room for an increase in the fee paid by country 2. The latter effect stands in sharp contrast to the case where the participation constraint is absent (in which the fee paid by country 2, instead, would decrease) and works to reduce the welfare cost of raising revenue to the point where the marginal cost of public funds perceived by the national government in country 1 is unity. As such, when the national public good is efficiently provided in both countries, efficient provision of the federal public good follows from the federal first order conditions in equations (5a) and (5b).

In part (b) of the proposition, where country 2 is first mover while country 1 treats the federal government as a Nash-competitor, this reasoning no longer holds, since the comparative statics properties of equations
(6a) and (6b) imply that the second and third terms on the right hand side of equation (8) sum to a positive number for country 2. The reason is that an additional dollar of revenue raised by the government in country 2 leads to an increase in the fee paid by country 2 to the federal government and a decrease in the fee paid by country 1, implying that the marginal cost of public funds exceeds unity from the point of view of country 2. In this case, the outcome is similar to that derived in earlier research in that federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds undermines the motive to collect tax revenue at the lower level of government.

In terms of the EU, one can think of arguments for either scenario in the proposition, and it is not a priori clear to us which one is the more realistic. The basic lesson from our study is that federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds does not necessarily cause under-provision of public goods (neither at the lower level nor at the federal level), if the member states are free to leave the economic federation. Instead, addressing the efficiency aspects of federal redistribution policy requires in this case more information, and our study shows what additional information to look for. Therefore, whether or not federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds distorts the incentives underlying public good provision in a voluntary fiscal union is ultimately an empirical question.

References


